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January 23, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-5303 
BELTRAN 
v. 
Motion of Petitioner for 
Summary Reversal and Remand 
in Part 
MYERS CA 9 
SUMMARY: On Nov. 3, the Court granted cert limited to the 
question of whether California's application of a transfer of assets 
rule to its medically needy aged, blind, and disabled applicants for 
Medicaid, resulting in the denial of assistance to individuals other-
wise eligible, contradicts the applicable portions of the Social 
Security Act and thus violates the Supremacy Clause. On Dec. 23, 
the President signed legislation that will explicitly permit states 
to employ a transfer of assets rule to applicants for Medicaid. 
Petr seeks summary reversal and remand on the ground that the new 
legislation confirms that Calif.'s application of a transfer of assets 
rule was contrary to existing legislation. 
I 
- 2 -
BACKGROUND: Title XIX of the Social Security Act established 
the Medicaid program, a cooperative federal-state program to provide 
medical assistance to certain classes of people. States are not 
required to participate; if they do, they must develop plans that 
conform to the federal guidelines. The states must provide assist-
ance to "categorically needy" individuals, that is, ryrsons receiving 
certain enumerated kinds of assistance (such as Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI)). 
The states apparently have some discretion in determining how 
"medically needy" individuals are covered. These are individuals 
who become needy because of medical expenses. At issue is whether 
Calif. may apply a transfer of assets (TOA) rule to these individuals. 
The TOA rule can operate to prevent a person from qualifying as 
"medically needy" if within two years of the application he has 
transferred assets for less than full consideration. The rule raises 
v a presumption that the transfer was made to enable the applicant to 
qualify for aid. 
Under federal law the TOA rule may not be utilized in determining 
eligibility for SSI payments and hence may not be applied to 
"categorically needy" individuals. The petr, the responsible federal 
agency and most courts hold that the federal statutes and regulations 
iltrJ 
do not permit the application of a more stringent criteri~ to "medicall 
needy" individuals than to "categorically needy" persons. Calif. and 
the CA 9 disagree. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the legislation enacted Dec. 28, 
by permitting use of TOA rules in determining eligibility for both 
SSI and Medicaid assistance, confirms petr's contention that Calif.'• 
TOA rule was contrary to existing federal legislation. Petr arguee 
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that the legislation was explicitly intended to change a perceived 
inadequacy in the existing statutes: namely, that a person could 
meet the financial eligibility requirement for SSI by disposing of 
his assets. Since Calif. 's TOA rule does not allow this, petr con-
eludes that it is contrary to the federal statutes. 
Petr argues that in light of the explicit congressional recogni-
tion of present federal law, the Court should summarily reverse and 
remand . Petr also suggests that as to applicants after the effective 
date of the new legislation, July 1 , 1981, the lower courts' decisions 
should be vacated and the matter remanded for consideration of Calif .' s 
~ TOA rule under the new legislation (possibly with a new class repre-
sentative). 
Resp in its brief argues that the use of subsequent legislative 
history to interpret the statute is of dubious value. Resp argues 
that this Court has recognized that pronouncements by a subsequent 
Congress are not entitled to the same weight as those of the Congress 
that enacted a measure. Furthermore, resp points out that the Senate 
Finance Committee in its explanation of the subsequently enacted bill 
stated that its recognition of the existence of court opinions adopt-
ing petr's position should not be construed as agreement with the 
opinions. Finally resp argues that the new legislation , in adopting 
Calif. ' s approach, suggests the greater wisdom of Calif .' s policy . 
DISCUSSION: Regar dless of the ultimate merits of petr ' s case , 
it does not lend itself to summary treatment. Petr ' s argument that 
the existing laws prohibited the use of TOA rules in the eligibility 
standard for "medically needy" depends on an analysis of the statutes, 
with which the CA 9 disagreed . Similarly petr' s use of the new legis-
lation to support her position also relies on an analysis of the n ew 
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statutes. 
The new statutes do not expressly support petr ' s position 
and a determination of Congress's intent is complicated by two factors. 
First, the new legislation specifically changed the rules for SSI 
eligibility . In light of this change, it is difficult to determine 
whether Congress addressed the particular problem of the standard 
for "medically needy". Second, Congress may be motivated by a conclu-
sion that an existing practice is questionable rather than that it is 
illegal. 
Petr has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the CA 9 
was so clearly wrong as to allow summary reversal. 
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